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Abstract
Commodity prices are important both as a source of shocks and for the propaga-
tion of shocks originating elsewhere in the economy. Many vector autoregression
(VAR) studies estimate a gradual response of commodity prices to monetary policy
shocks. Exploiting information in high-frequency financial market data, and using
the methods of Rigobon and Sack (2004) I find that a 10 basis point surprise change
in interest rates causes commodity prices to fall immediately by about 0.5%. This
is about two-thirds of the estimated response of the S&P500, and about five times
larger than the response in a VAR 12 months after the shock. Metals prices tend to
respond more than agricultural commodities. The point estimate for oil prices is
similar to other commodities, but is estimated imprecisely.
∗Contact: Dean Scrimgeour, Economics Department, Colgate University, 13 Oak Drive, Hamilton, NY
13346. Email: dscrimgeour@colgate.edu. This work has benefited from comments from Emily Conover,
Ed Gamber, Chad Jones, Yuriy Gorodnichenko, Roisin O’Sullivan, Ann Owen, Christina Romer, David
Romer, Nicole Simpson, Julie Smith, Chad Sparber, and Marc Tomljanovich. Thanks also to RC Research
for providing futures data.
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1. Introduction
I explore the influence of monetary policy on commodity prices. Since commodity
prices help determine a wide range of consumer and producer prices, the response
of commodity prices to monetary policy may be an important aspect of the monetary
transmission mechanism. The relationship between commodity prices and monetary
policy has been given a lot of attention over the years. Some blame the inflation of the
1970s on rising commodity prices (see for example, Blinder, 1982). By contrast Barsky
and Kilian (2001) argue that commodity prices tended to rise in the 1970s in response
to anticipated inflation brought on by loose monetary policy.
During the 2005-2008 period, elevated commodity prices brought renewed atten-
tion to commodity markets. Would high oil prices lead to inflation? Would they cause
a recession? Would they generate both, returning the economy to stagflation as in the
1970s? Explanations for why commodity prices have been high include growing de-
mand in China and speculative behavior in financial markets (Hamilton, 2009). In ad-
dition, revisiting Barsky and Kilian (2001), Taylor (2009) has argued that loose monetary
policy may be behind the surge in commodity prices.
This paper attempts to measure the size of monetary policy surprises’ effects on
commodity prices. Like other financial market prices, commodity prices are relatively
flexible, adjusting quickly in response to shocks. Any effects of monetary policy an-
nouncements on commodity prices likely occur within a short period of the announce-
ment, by contrast with retail prices, which are stickier. I study the relationship between
commodity prices and interest rates around particular news-related events. The event
days are when the Federal Reserve’s Open Markets Committee meets and financial mar-
kets acquire new information about the course of monetary policy.
The paper is related to Cook and Hahn (1989) who focused on meeting dates to
measure the response of bond markets to changes in the Federal Reserve’s target fed-
eral funds rate. However, Cook and Hahn’s study ignores the fact that financial market
participants learn about more than just monetary policy on these event days. Rigobon
and Sack (2004), whose method I implement, account for the fact that other forces may
move both interest rates and asset prices on event days, confounding the event study
estimator. They show how to estimate the effect of monetary policy on asset prices
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using instrumental variables techniques that rely on non-event days to provide infor-
mation about the typical relationship between interest rates and commodity prices.
Deviation from this normal relationship on event days is interpreted as being due to
monetary policy surprises.
The results in this paper indicate a rapid, statistically significant, and economically
significant response of commodity prices to monetary policy. Point estimates suggest
that a 10 basis point increase in interest rates would cause commodity prices to fall by
approximately 0.5% immediately. This finding poses a challenge for vector autoregres-
sion (VAR) studies that impose the restriction that commodity prices can only respond
to monetary policy surprises from previous months or quarters (Christiano et al., 1999).
In a standard recursively-identified VAR, a 10 basis point surprise increase in interest
rates would lower commodity prices by approximately 0.1% after a year, with smaller
responses closer to the timing of the surprise.
Section 2 discusses related literature. Section 3 reviews the empirical approach.
Section 4 presents results, and section 5 concludes.
2. RelatedWork
Monetary policy affects asset prices, including commodity prices, in a variety of ways.
Commodities and bonds are substitutes as assets that store value. When the Federal
Reserve sells bonds to raise interest rates, demand for commodities falls. Therefore
commodity prices should fall when interest rates rise due to monetary intervention.
Other shocks, such as new information about bond risk, might move bond prices and
commodity prices in opposite directions.
Taylor (2009) presents a monetary explanation for the recent peaks in commodity
prices. He argues that oil prices increased in 2007 and 2008 because the Federal Open
Market Committee (FOMC) reduced in interest rates. Similarly Frankel (2008) has ar-
gued that reductions in interest rates could increase commodity prices. In his work
he emphasizes an overshooting mechanism in the response of commodity prices to
monetary policy.1 The overshooting story aims to explain the magnitude of the rise in
1See also Frankel (1984); Frankel and Hardouvelis (1985); Frankel (1986).
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commodity prices in response to a monetary policy surprise.2
Consistent with weak forms of the efficient markets hypothesis, I assume the effect
of monetary policy surprises occurs on the day the surprises occur. In the Dornbusch
(1976) model, the large movement of the asset price happens exactly at the moment
of the shock. There are no predictable jumps in the asset price after this point. An
arbitrage relationship equates the expected returns on bonds and other safe assets (c.f.
Hotelling, 1931).
To see the influence of monetary policy on commodity prices, consider the follow-
ing stripped-down, continuous-time version of the Dornbusch-Frankel model. Mone-
tary policy is described by an interest rate rule
푖푡 = 푖¯+ 휓(푝푡 − 푝¯), 휓 > 0
where 푝푡 is the level of consumer prices, for which the central bank has a target of 푝¯.
When the price level is above its target, the central bank sets interest rates above the
long-run average interest rate 푖¯. Consumer prices adjust gradually toward the target
level
푝˙푡 = −휃(푝푡 − 푝¯), 휃 > 0
since when the price level is above the target, monetary policy is tight and inflation is
low. When the price level is below the target, monetary policy is loose, and inflation is
high. Intertemporal optimization in the supply of commodities implies the Hotelling
rule, that
푝˙푐표푚,푡 = 푖푡
where 푝푐표푚 is the commodity price. Consumer prices are predetermined, but commod-
ity prices are flexible. In the long run, commodity prices and consumer prices are equal
푝푡 = 푝푐표푚,푡.
2Caballero et al. (2008a,b) also link interest rates and commodity prices, noting that commodity prices
have been high at the same time real interest rates have been low in recent years. They emphasize a global
savings glut (Bernanke, 2005) to explain levels of interest rates and commodity prices. During the early
stages of the financial crisis, when debt began looking riskier, there was a sell-off in bonds and investors
substituted some commodities for bonds in their portfolios.
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Assuming that 푖¯ = 0 the model’s solution is straightforward:
푝푡 = (푝0 − 푝¯)푒−휃푡 + 푝¯ (1)
= 푝¯(1− 푒−휃푡) + 푝0푒−휃푡 (2)
푝푐표푚,푡 = 푝¯− 휓
휃
(푝0 − 푝¯)푒−휃푡 (3)
= 푝¯(1 +
휓
휃
)푒−휃푡 − 휓
휃
푝0푒
−휃푡 (4)
where 푝0 is the initial, predetermined consumer price level.
An unexpected increase in 푝¯ causes a fall in interest rates. The consumer price level
푝 does not move when the shock occurs but the commodity price does. The lower in-
terest rate causes the commodity price to rise. The commodity price overshoots, rising
more in the short run than the long run. (The short run effect on 푝푐표푚 of a one unit
change in 푝¯ is (1 + 휓휃 ) > 1 while the long run effect is 1.)
Consider an unexpected, permanent change in the consumer price level target at
time zero. The effect on the commodity price level is largest when the shock occurs
∂푝푐표푚,푡
∂푝¯
= 1 +
휓
휃
푒−휃푡 > 0
∂2푝푐표푚,푡
∂푡∂푝¯
= −휓푒−휃푡 < 0
so that there are implications for the term structure of commodity prices. Spot prices
should move more than futures prices, and the difference between the responses is due
to 휓 and 휃. This is the analog of Dornbusch’s overshooting result, and I test for it using
an index of commodity price futures at various horizons.
An alternative representation of the solution to the model gives the commodity
price as a function of the entire path of future interest rates:
푝푐표푚,푡 = 푝¯−
∫ ∞
0
푖휏푑휏.
According to this formulation short-lived deviations of interest rates from their equilib-
rium level will induce small movements in commodity prices. When the interest rate
is away from its equilibrium level for a longer period, the effect on commodity prices
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is larger. Timing surprises are information about relatively short duration deviations of
interest rates from their previously anticipated path, and so should have smaller effects
on commodity prices. Timing surprises are unlikely to affect asset markets as much as
surprises about the future level of interest rates. This is why it is important to measure
monetary policy shocks in a way that separates timing surprises from level surprises.
In measuring the effect of monetary policy surprises on commodity prices I follow
Rigobon and Sack (2004) who modify the event study procedure to account for other
(unknown) factors that may influence both interest rates and asset prices on event days.
They apply these methods to estimate the effect of monetary policy surprises on stock
and bond yields. Other studies using these methods have estimated the effects of mon-
etary policy on stock prices, interest rates, and exchange rates.3 Mine is the only study
to apply these methods to analyze the effect of monetary policy on commodity prices
using high-frequency data.4 Following Rigobon and Sack, I measure monetary policy
surprises using three-month Eurodollar futures. Since these are not spot rates, they are
less affected by surprises due to the Fed adjusting its target rate a month earlier or later
than expected (a timing surprise).5
I also use the Kuttner (2001) method as a robustness check. Kuttner’s work shows
how to use federal funds futures contracts to measure monetary policy surprises.6 Con-
ditional on accurate measurement of the surprise, assessing its effects on financial mar-
kets is relatively straightforward. The federal funds futures shock may capture impor-
tant timing surprises related to when the Federal Reserve adjusts policy, so the federal
funds futures shock mingles timing and level information. As in Kuttner, I use the spot
3Craine and Martin (2008) apply the same approach to estimate the effect of U.S. policy surprises on
Australian stocks and bonds and the USD/AUD exchange rate (as well as effects of Australian monetary
policy surprises).
4Frankel and Hardouvelis (1985) look at the commodity price response to weekly money supply an-
nouncements in the early 1980s, but give a different interpretation to the results. If commodity prices
respond to the announcements, it is interpreted as evidence that the Federal Reserve’s previously an-
nounced monetary target is disregarded by market participants. If there is no response, this is interpreted
to mean that markets regard the monetary surprise as an error in hitting the target rather than a change
in the target. The methods in this paper, because they rely on forward-looking measures of policy, are not
confounded by a targeting error.
5Timing surprises relate to the level and slope of the yield curve. Significant monetary policy surprises
affect the level of the yield curve (longer-term interest rates), whereas timing surprises affect the slope. For
example, a change in the federal funds target rate that affects the anticipated rate in two weeks from the
present but does not affect the anticipated rate three months into the future contains a timing surprise.
The Kuttner method, since it uses primarily current month futures is more susceptible to timing surprises.
6Gu¨rkaynak et al. (2005) and Bernanke and Kuttner (2005), among others, follow this approach.
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month federal funds futures contract to measure the shock, switching over to using the
next month federal funds futures contract if an event day is within three days of the end
of the month.
3. Empirical Setup
Rigobon and Sack (2004) show how to modify the standard event study method to ac-
count for the endogeneity of the change in the interest rate. Consider estimating 훽 in
Δ푝푡 = 훽Δ푖푡 + 휖푡 (5)
Δ푖푡 = 푚푝푡 + 휈푡 (6)
where Δ푝 is the change in the (log) price of an asset and Δ푖 is the change in an interest
rate. Endogeneity problems arise because interest rates move for many reasons, even
on event days, and these reasons may be related to other factors that affect asset prices
(휖).7 In particular, 푚푝 is the monetary surprise, which is zero on non-event days but
may be non-zero on events days. The shock 휈 may be correlated with 휖 causing Δ푖 to be
endogenous in equation 5, even on event days. On event days the variance-covariance
matrix of [Δ푝푡,Δ푖푡]
′ changes in a way that allows us to identify 훽.
Rigobon and Sack show how to identify 훽 using an instrumental variables approach.
The instrumental variable is defined as
푧푡 =
⎧⎨⎩
Δ푖푡 on event days
−Δ푖푡 on non-event days
and the equation is estimated using all the event days and the days immediately prior
7As an application, the “policy surprise” measured from Federal Funds Futures contracts shows appar-
ent surprises on non-event days as well as event days. It is likely that some of the movements in the Federal
Funds Futures on non-event days (and possibly also on event days) represent the anticipated response of
the Federal Reserve to news, rather than a monetary policy surprise.
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to the event days. Instrumental variables is consistent for 훽:
훽ˆ퐼푉 → 푐표푣(푧푡,Δ푝푡)
푐표푣(푧푡,Δ푖푡)
=
1
2(훽(휎
2
푚푝 + 휎
2
휈) + 휎휖,휈)− 12(훽휎2휈 + 휎휖,휈)
1
2(휎
2
푚푝 + 휎
2
휈)− 12휎2휈
= 훽
where 휎2푚푝 is the variance of the monetary policy surprise, 휎
2
휈 is the variance of 휈, 휎휖,휈 is
the covariance of 휖 with 휈, and we assume that monetary policy shocks 푚푝 are uncor-
related with either 휖 or 휈.
Table 1 shows some summary statistics for changes in commodity prices and the
three-month Eurodollar futures rate on event days (when the FOMC meets) and non-
event days.8 The variances of commodity price movements tend to be higher on event
days, and the covariances with the interest rate tend to be more negative. I use all reg-
ularly scheduled Federal Open Market Committee meeting dates from 1994 to March
2008 as event days. This gives 114 event days. As a robustness check, I also look at
FOMC chairs’ testimonies presented under the Humphrey-Hawkins regulation as ad-
ditional event days as well as extending the sample of events back to 1989.
I have daily data on seventeen commodities over this period. There are nine metals
(gold, silver, copper, aluminum, tin, zinc, platinum, lead, and nickel)9, seven agricul-
tural commodities (cocoa, coffee, cotton, wheat, hogs, live cattle, and livestock), and
oil. For each commodity I fail to reject the null hypothesis of a unit root in the log of
the price level with a Phillips-Perron test. This is important, since it means the effects I
estimate using daily data are likely to be long lasting, and will eventually affect output
and consumer prices.
4. Results
8Variables in my data are recorded before the FOMC announcements come out, so the event day move-
ments are for the difference between prices the day after the announcement and the day of the announce-
ment.
9Data for lead prices start in 1995.
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4.1. Response of Commodity Prices toMonetary Policy Surprises
Tables 2 and 3 show estimates of the effect of monetary policy surprises on commod-
ity prices. Table 2 shows estimates when commodity prices are grouped together. The
commodity prices are not aggregated, but a single effect is estimated using data on
prices of a group of commodities. The groups are All Commodities, All Metals, All
Agricultural commodities (of which there are Vegetable commodities and Animal com-
modities), and Oil. Since there is correlation across commodities in daily price changes,
the standard errors are clustered at the day level. Table 3 shows the estimated effects for
each commodity. The tables show both the event study estimates (from the OLS regres-
sion of 100 times the change in the log commodity price on the change in the interest
rate, in percentage points, on event days) and the Rigobon-Sack estimate.10 Table 2
also includes Three-Stage Least Squares estimates of the full system of equations.
The results show that monetary policy surprises have substantial effects on com-
modity prices. Consider a situation in which the Federal Reserve is expected to either
keep interest rates at some level (with 40% probability) or raise them 25 basis points
(with probability 60%). On average, interest rates are expected to rise by 15 basis points.
If the FOMC actually raises interest rates 25 basis points, there is a 10 basis point sur-
prise. According to my estimates, a 10 basis point surprise increase in interest rates re-
duces commodity prices overall by about 0.6%, with a standard error of 0.2%. Rigobon
and Sack estimate that the S&P500 responds to a shock of this size by about 0.7%. (The
corresponding coefficient is around -6.81 rather than -6.36.)
The response of metals is somewhat larger, while the response of agricultural com-
modities is smaller. For a 10 basis point surprise increase in interest rates, metals prices
tend to fall by 0.75%, while agricultural commodities fall by 0.49%. The price of oil falls
by 0.67% in response to such a monetary surprise. The estimated effect on the price of
oil is economically significant, but the standard error is relatively large.
When we consider the effect of monetary policy surprises on individual commodi-
ties some prices appear to respond much more than others. Tin, lead, cotton, wheat
and coffee each appear to respond less to monetary policy surprises. By contrast prices
of gold, silver, platinum, and nickel respond more strongly to monetary policy sur-
prises. Some of the standard errors are large, but the data reveal a general pattern of
10The Rigobon-Sack estimate corresponds to 훼ˆℎ푒푡푖 in Rigobon and Sack’s paper.
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commodity prices falling in response to monetary tightening.
The results estimated on the full sample are sensitive to the inclusion of the 18
March, 2008, FOMC announcement. Tables 2 and 3 include a column of estimates
based on the data excluding March 2008. The estimates are substantially smaller when
March 2008 is excluded. For three commodities (coffee, cotton, and wheat) the point
estimate becomes positive. Overall, the estimates still suggest a substantial response of
commodity prices in general to monetary policy surprises. The estimated coefficient
for all commodities is -4.52 instead of -6.36.
On 18 March, 2008, days after the collapse of Bear Stearns, the FOMC reduced the
funds rate 75 basis points. In its statement, the FOMC noted that some members had
wanted a smaller change. The three-month Eurodollar futures rate increased around
20 basis points, and commodity prices fell around 4% on average. This is four times
greater than the response implied by estimates using only the data in the rest of my
dataset. Perhaps the apparent lack of concern with the growing financial and economic
turmoil among some FOMC members caused the large sell-off in commodity prices.
4.2. Robustness
This section reports on several robustness checks. The previous section noted the im-
portance of the 18 March, 2008, event. Aside from this event, the findings reported so
far are generally robust to variations in the sample period, the definition of events, and
the method used to estimate the response of commodity prices.
First, consider extending the sample period. Table 4 shows how the estimated re-
sponses of commodity prices to monetary policy are affected by using date from 1989
to 1993 in addition to the 1994 to 2008 period. The magnitudes of the estimates are
similar but are less precise even though more data is used. When even earlier data are
added, the estimated effect becomes smaller.
The reason for the larger standard errors is that the first-stage regression is much
weaker when the earlier period is included. The strength of the first stage is determined
by the difference between the variance of the Eurodollar futures rate on event days and
pre-event days. The Federal Reserve’s policy was much less transparent before 1994,
so the news generated on the event day was less clear and did not move markets as
much. This is especially true prior to 1989. From 1994, the Federal Reserve released
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more information immediately upon making a decision. Enhanced transparency does
not mean there are no surprises. There have continued to be surprises in this era, and
the Federal Reserve’s enhanced transparency means these surprises and their effects
are more easily measured.
Adding the Federal Reserve chairman’s Humphrey-Hawkins testimony dates as event
days to the original sample (as in Rigobon and Sack) reduces the estimated response of
commodity prices somewhat. For example, the estimated response for all commodity
prices is -5.25 instead of -6.36. The estimated responses of the other categories reported
are also attenuated relative to the original results. (And in contrast to adding the earlier
years to the sample, adding the chairman’s testimonies lowers the standard errors.)
Demiralp and Jorda (2004) argue that the Federal Reserve’s actions have a larger
effect when it reverses the previous direction of policy. That is, when it begins raising
interest rates or begins lowering them, markets respond more. A simple test of whether
this is true of commodity prices by excluding dates when the Federal Reserve reverses
the path of the federal funds target from my regressions. (There are eight such dates in
my main sample.) I do not find a systematically smaller response of commodity prices
to interest rates. Metals prices do seem to respond less, but agricultural commodities
seem to respond more when the policy reversals are excluded.
I implement the Kuttner (2001) method using federal funds futures contracts to es-
timate the effect of monetary policy surprises. These estimates suggest a smaller, more
precisely estimated, effect of monetary policy on commodity prices. The magnitude
of the responses is broadly similar, with the overall response of commodity prices to a
10 basis point monetary policy shock being -0.45% according to the Kuttner estimates,
instead of -0.64% according to the Rigobon and Sack estimates, when the base sample
is used.
4.3. The Response of Commodity Futures
In addition to the estimated response of commodity prices in the spot market, I esti-
mate the response of commodity futures. Since commodity futures reveal the expected
future level of the commodity index, we can examine whether shorter horizon futures
respond more, as implied by the theory of overshooting. Table 5 presents the estimated
responses of the Goldman Sachs Commodity Index (GSCI) futures contracts for one
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month through five months. The GSCI is heavily weighted toward oil and energy prod-
ucts, so the estimated responses are similar to the response of the price of oil. The table
presents separate estimates for each commodity, first from single equation methods,
then from the seemingly unrelated regression, estimated by GLS.
I fail to reject the hypothesis that all contracts respond the same amount to a given
shock. (The null is equivalent to no overshooting.) However it is interesting to note
that the pattern of responses, with smaller responses for contracts with more distant
settlement dates, is consistent with the overshooting model.
VAR studies often include commodity prices to ameliorate the price puzzle – a tem-
porary increase of consumer prices in response to a monetary tightening (Sims, 1992).
My findings indicate that a common identification assumption used in these models –
that monetary policy responds to contemporaneous commodity price movements but
not vice versa – is invalid. I estimate that a surprise monetary policy tightening of 10
basis points would cause about a half percent reduction in commodity prices on the
same day the tightening occurs. However, according to a baseline VAR (Christiano et
al., 1999), a monetary policy tightening of approximately 10 basis points of the fed-
eral funds rate reduces commodity prices about 0.1% after one year and 0.2% after two
years. The gradual response estimated in the VAR is in stark contrast to the immediate
response I find. Figure 3 compares these estimates in graphical form.11 The confidence
interval for the GSCI futures responses are wide and encompass the VAR impulse re-
sponse function. According to my results, the near zero response of commodity prices
estimated in the VAR is just as likely to be the truth as a 4% response.
The recursively identified VAR cannot separately estimate immediate effects of com-
modity prices on monetary policy and of monetary policy on commodity prices. The
results in this paper suggest the effect of monetary policy on commodity prices, often
assumed to be zero, may be substantial. Further work should investigate the conse-
quences for structural VARs.
11The data fro the VAR come from Christiano et al. (1999). The commodity price variable is the percent-
age change in a smoothed index of commodity prices. The impulse response function I report is for the
cumulative effect of the shock on the level of commodity prices.
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4.4. Effects of Changes in the Term Structure
Table 6 presents regression estimates that attempt to uncover the effects of changes
in near term and more distant interest rates. There is much discussion about how to
interpret surprise movements in interest rates when the Federal Reserve makes a policy
decision. Does the Fed have information about the future evolution of the economy
that others learn about (Romer and Romer, 2000), or does the Fed reveal information
about its own targets (Gu¨rkaynak et al., 2005)? This debate has been informed by the
response of long-term interest rates to monetary policy shocks.
In this regression, I estimate the effect of a change in the two-year treasury yield
(which I interpret as a measure of changes in near term interest rates) and the effect of
a change in expected future yields. The expected future yield is measured as
10푖10푦 − 5푖5푦
5
where 푖10푦 is the yield on a ten year Treasury security and 푖5푦 is the yield on a five year
Treasury security. This new variable is approximately the expected five year interest
rate that will prevail in five years time. To the extent that the economy is expected to
be close to steady state in five years, and the Fed does not reveal information about the
steady state real interest rate, changes in this variable can be interpreted as changes in
expected inflation. I use an instrumental variables estimator in the spirit of Rigobon
and Sack here.
Whereas increases in near term interest rates tend to depress commodity prices, Ta-
ble 6 shows that increases in expected interest rates at the long horizon tend to increase
commodity prices. A plausible interpretation is that commodity prices rise in response
to higher than expected future inflation. As a matter of economic significance, the point
estimates are large. A one percentage point increase in the expected interest rate, which
could be interpreted as a one percentage point increase in the expected inflation rate,
raises commodity prices today by around 7.6%. As a matter of statistical significance,
the standard errors for these estimates are large so the estimates are consistent with a
wide range of interpretations.
14 DEAN SCRIMGEOUR
5. Conclusion
On 16 November 1999, the Federal Open Markets Committee raised the federal funds
rate 25 basis points. This move was mostly anticipated by financial markets, but the
three-month Eurodollar futures rate did increase by five basis points. On the same day,
commodity prices fell by about a quarter of one percent, broadly consistent with the
effect of a monetary policy surprise on commodity prices as I estimate it.
My results are in line with estimates of the effect of monetary policy on other asset
prices. I estimate that monetary policy surprises have a smaller impact on commodi-
ties than on stock prices, but the effect is the same order of magnitude. This adds to
our knowledge of the impact of monetary policy on asset markets and the economy in
general.
Prices of many commodities doubled between 2000 and 2007. Some analysts have
blamed this fact on the Federal Reserve’s loose monetary policy. According to the esti-
mates in this paper, each percentage point reduction in interest rates instigated by the
Fed increases commodity prices around 5%. Monetary policy surprises over this pe-
riod of time simply cannot have been large enough to generate this sustained increase
in commodity prices if the estimates in this paper are to be believed.
The estimates presented here do add some credence to the Barsky and Kilian ac-
count of commodity price movements and monetary policy in the 1970s. Consider
a scenario in which commodity traders foresaw a large increase in inflation over the
course of the 1970s. If inflation were foreseen to rise by ten percentage points, the
point estimates from Table 6 using term structure information suggest that commodity
prices could be expected to rise by around 76% for all commodities, 56% for agricultural
commodities, and around 92% for metals. These estimates are statistically imprecise,
but economically significant.
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Figure 1: Selected Commodity Prices, 1994-2007
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Notes: this graph shows daily data on (100 times) the log of prices of oil (Brent Crude), gold, coffee, and
hogs. The series are normalized to be equal to zero at the beginning of 1994.
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Figure 2: Relationship between Commodity Prices on Event Days and Pre-Event Days
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Notes: this graph shows scatter plots of the percentage change in commodity prices against the change
the three-month Eurodollar futures rate, on both pre-event days (left panel) and event days (right panel).
The change in the interest rate is measured in basis points. The graph includes data from each commodity
series used in the paper.
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Figure 3: Dynamic Response of Commodity Prices to Monetary Policy Surprises
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Notes: this graph shows the estimated response over time of commodity prices to a monetary policy sur-
prise using the Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1999) VAR and GSCI commodity futures. The re-
sponses are shown with 95% confidence intervals. In the VAR, these are constructed using the 2.5 per-
centile and the 97.5 percentile of the distribution of responses in a Monte Carlo simulation where the
parameter vector is drawn from a normal distribution centered on the VAR estimates, with the estimated
parameter covariance matrix.
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Table 1: Variation of Commodity Prices and Covariation with Interest Rate
Std. dev. of Commodity Price Covariance with Policy Rate
Commodity Event Day Pre-event Event day Pre-event
Gold 1.16 0.70 -2.62 -0.10
Aluminum 1.25 1.02 -1.82 0.04
Copper 1.48 1.30 -2.34 -0.36
Lead 1.75 1.59 -1.77 -0.26
Nickel 1.98 2.01 -3.01 -0.68
Platinum 1.33 1.14 -2.19 0.28
Silver 1.86 1.27 -4.02 0.39
Tin 1.27 1.26 -0.74 -0.19
Zinc 1.76 1.52 -2.40 -0.32
Cocoa 1.94 1.98 -2.60 0.84
Coffee 2.58 2.77 -1.99 -1.08
Cotton 1.52 1.47 -0.62 0.12
Wheat 1.82 1.30 -1.32 -0.52
Hogs 1.53 1.50 -1.65 0.06
Livestock 1.01 0.93 -0.98 0.05
Live Cattle 0.93 1.01 -0.93 0.16
Oil 2.77 2.39 -2.18 -0.26
Notes: the change in the interest rate is measured in basis points. The change in commodity prices is
measured in percentage points.
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Table 2: Estimated Effects of Interest Rates on Commodity Prices
Commodity Event Study Rigobon-Sack Excl. March 08
All Commodities -5.55 -6.36 -4.52
(1.75) (2.08) (1.28)
All Metals -6.63 -7.49 -5.43
(2.24) (2.69) (2.18)
All Agricultural -4.09 -4.89 -3.19
(1.87) (2.26) (1.82)
All Vegetable -4.64 -5.04 -1.88
(2.69) (3.33) (2.35)
All Animal -3.37 -4.68 -4.95
(1.69) (2.14) (2.35)
Oil -6.23 -6.68 -5.78
(3.68) (4.75) (4.47)
Notes: coefficients represent the estimated percentage responses of commodity prices to a one percentage
point surprise in interest rates. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. (Clustering is at the level of date.)
Standard errors for the effect on oil prices are White heteroskedasticity robust standard errors.
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Table 4: Robustness Checks
With With Excluding Kuttner
Commodity ’89-’93 Testimonies Reversals Method
All Commodities -6.68 -5.25 -6.94 -4.55
(2.39) (1.89) (2.76) (1.27)
All Metals -7.94 -6.25 -6.71 -4.85
(2.98) (2.46) (3.49) (1.72)
All Agricultural -3.91 -3.96 -7.27 -4.22
(2.76) (2.00) (2.67) (1.31)
All Vegetable -2.86 -4.19 –7.94 -4.46
(4.22) (2.89) (3.96) (1.81)
All Animal -5.32 -3.67 -6.39 -3.91
(2.69) (1.90) (2.81) (1.38)
Oil -14.41 -5.37 -6.68 -4.17
(7.92) (5.01) (6.17) (3.40)
Notes: standard errors are clustered at the day level (or robust standard errors for oil).
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Table 5: Response of Commodity Price Futures
Single
Contract Equation 3SLS
GSCI 1 Month -4.03 -4.03
(4.11) (2.74)
GSCI 2 Month -3.69 -3.69
(4.04) (2.56)
GSCI 3 Month -3.38 -3.38
(4.03) (2.48)
GSCI 4 Month -3.38 -3.38
(3.98) (2.39)
GSCI 5 Month -3.34 -3.34
(3.95) (2.31)
Notes: this table presents estimates of the effect of monetary policy surprises on commodity futures con-
tracts, using the Goldman-Sachs Commodity Index futures for one through five months. Robust standard
errors for the first column, 3SLS standard errors for the second column.
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Table 6: Commodity Prices and Changes in the Term Structure
Commodity Two Year Rate Long Forward Rate
All Commodities -6.99 7.60
(2.30) (5.68)
All Metals -7.47 9.23
(3.53) (9.70)
All Agricultural -5.36 5.62
(1.77) (4.86)
Notes: each row is a separate regression. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. (Clustering is at the
level of the date.)
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A Data Sources
Table A.1: Commodity Prices
Commodity Series Name Code
Gold S&P GSCI Gold Spot GSGCSPT
Aluminum S&P GSCI Aluminum Spot GSIASPT
Copper S&P GSCI Copper Spot GSICSPT
Lead S&P GSCI Lead Spot GSILSPT
Nickel S&P GSCI Nickel Spot GSIKSPT
Platinum London Platinum Free Market $/Troy oz PLATFRE
Silver S&P GSCI Silver Spot GSSISPT
Tin LME-Tin 99.85% Cash U$/MT LTICASH
Zinc S&P GSCI Zinc Spot GSIZSPT
Cocoa S&P GSCI Cocoa Index Spot GSCCSPT
Coffee S&P GSCI Coffee Spot GSKCSPT
Cotton S&P GSCI Cotton Spot GSCTSPT
Wheat S&P GSCI Wheat(CBOT) Spot GSWHSPT
Livestock S&P GSCI Livestock Spot GSLVSPT
Live Hogs S&P GSCI Live Hogs Index Spot GSLHSPT
Live Cattle S&P GSCI Live Cattle Spot GSLCSPT
Oil Europe Brent Crude Spot FOB ($ per barrel) RBRTE
GSCI 1 month GSCI One Month Futures GS1MSPT
GSCI 2 month GSCI Two Month Futures GS2MSPT
GSCI 3 month GSCI Three Month Futures GS3MSPT
GSCI 4 month GSCI Four Month Futures GS4MSPT
GSCI 5 month GSCI Five Month Futures GS5MSPT
Notes: All series in this table are taken from the Datastream database, except for the price of oil, which is
taken from the U.S. Department of Energy’s Energy Information Administration.
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Table A.2: Other Variables
Variable Source Code
Three-Month Eurodollar Futures Rate RC Research ED
Federal Funds Futures Rate RC Research FF
Two-Year Treasury Constant Maturity FRED DGS2
Five-Year Treasury Constant Maturity FRED DGS5
Ten-Year Treasury Constant Maturity FRED DGS10
